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Introduction 
Threats to the United States are widespread and ever changing.  On July 1st, 
2015, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and General Martin Dempsey unveiled 
the 2015 National Military Strategy.  In it, General Dempsey discussed threats 
to the United States along a continuum of conflict, highlighting specifically 
the significant dangers of a “hybrid threat.”1  Many pundits today regard the 
hybrid threat synonymous with “little green men;” a nod to the Russian 
Spetznaz forces that took part in the initial occupation of portions of Ukraine 
in 2014.2  While this threat poses a concern to a politically divided state like 
the Ukraine, are these types of forces a “real” national security threat to the 
United States when compared to the other myriad of threats in the 
contemporary environment?   
 
Unfortunately they are.  The hybrid threat occupies a prime spot in fine 
balance between probability of action and significance of consequence that 
make it the biggest threat over the next decade.  This article supports this 
claim by defining the problem, examining the threat spectrum, and 
articulating what the hybrid threat is.  It concludes by examining some 
potential counteractions to it. 
 
Definitions 
National Security Threats 
In 1943 Walter Lippmann provided one of the first definitions of U.S. national 
security when he wrote, "a nation has security when it does not have to 
sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to 
maintain them by war."3  U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown provided 
more specificity to these interests, including considering interests outside of 
its borders, when he defined national security as:  
 
“The ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to 
maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on 
                                                        
1 U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy 2015 (Washington D.C.: JCS, 
2015), available at: 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Str
ategy.pdf. 
2 Vitaly Shevchenko, "Little Green Men or Russian Invaders," BBC News, March 11, 2014, 
available at: http://www. bbc. com/news/world-europe-26532154.  
3 Lippmann, Walter, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1943). 
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reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance 
from disruption from outside; and to control its borders.”4  
 
More recently, the U.S. Department of Defense considers the sometimes-
adversarial nature of national security, the mix of military force and foreign 
relations, and the mix of symmetric and asymmetric threats when it describes 
it as:  
 
“Encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the 
United States with the purpose of gaining: a military or defense 
advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; a favorable 
foreign relations position; or a defense posture capable of successfully 
resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or 
covert.”5  
 
With these definitions of national security in mind, a definition of national 
security threats can be articulated as: State, organizational, or individual 
actions that threaten the nation’s territorial integrity or its domestic and 
international interests. 
 
Risk Assessment 
A second definition worth exploring is risk assessment.  In basic terms, risk 
assessment is a process that allows prioritization of threats to allow 
mitigation during the later risk management process.  Although several 
definitions exist throughout international relations literature, the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s definition of “identification and assessment of 
hazards” is simple and effective.6  Of note, this assessment includes 
categorizing each threat by a probability of occurrence (what is the chance it 
will occur?) as well as a consequence of impact (how much cumulative 
damage will it cause?).  This risk assessment nomenclature can be used to 
effectively assess the spectrum of possible threats. 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 Watson, Cynthia A. US National Security: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: 
Abc-clio, 2002). 
5 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms (Washington D.C.: JCS, 2016), available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.  
6 Ibid. 
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National Security Threats Considered 
When pondering a list of potential national security risks, one must consider 
external and internal, state and non-state, and security and non-security 
threats.  The first external and internal non-state threat considered is Violent 
Extremist Organizations (VEO), which President Obama defines as 
individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further 
political goals.7  These groups include both ideologically-motivated 
international terrorist organizations (ITO) and homegrown violent extremists 
(HVE).  Both fall under the rubric of terrorists, though HVEs may operate 
individually, as opposed to in groups.  Specific VEO tactics against the United 
States vary widely, but ultimately they seek to generate fear in the U.S. 
population by attacking targets that heighten the level of insecurity within the 
state.8  One could discount them as the primary threat for two reasons.  First, 
homegrown violent extremism does not appear to be growing.9  Secondly, 
although VEO and HVE attacks have a higher probability of occurrence when 
compared to other security threats and do have an admitted psychological 
impact on a population, the combined consequence of overall damage to the 
United States (9-11 aside) is low when compared to other potential threats.10  
 
A second external state-based threat to consider is adversarial states—
regional strongmen with previous adversarial relations with the United 
States—primarily including Russia and China.  Adversarial states could 
theoretically attack the U.S. homeland, using intercontinental and submarine-
based conventional and nuclear strike capabilities.  They similarly could 
attack U.S. overseas assets and allies using conventional air, ground, and sea-
based forces.  Adversarial states can also disrupt internal and external 
                                                        
7 The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the 
President, 2011), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-
final.pdf.  
8 Lutz, James M. and Brenda J. Lutz, Global Terrorism, (New York, NY: Psychology 
Press, 2004).  
9 Risa A. Brooks, "Muslim "Homegrown" Terrorism in the United States," International 
Security 36:2 (2011): 7-47, available at: 
http://live.belfercenter.org/files/Muslim%20Homegrown%20Terrorism%20in%20the
%20United%20States.pdf.  
10 Nadia Khomami, "Terrorist Attacks by Violent Jihadis in the US since 9/11," The 
Guardian (December 5, 2015), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/05/terrorist-attacks-by-islamists-in-the-us-since-911; Bruno S. Frey, 
Simon Leuchinger and Alois Stutzer,  "Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of 
Terrorism," Journal of Economic Surveys 21:1 (January 25, 2007): 1-24;  Navin A.Bapat,  
and Sean Zeigler, "Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict," 
American Journal of Political Science 60:2 (October 5, 2015). 
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command and control by targeting American technological dependencies.  
The U.S. military is highly dependent on space-based command, control, and 
communications.  Disrupting or destroying space-based satellites could 
significantly hinder American force communications, navigation, and 
surveillance.11  Another reason to discount this group as the primary threat is 
that, while these attacks would have a high consequence of impact when 
compared to other threats, their probability of occurrence is much lower than 
others.  Although these states may pursue subversive actions to undermine 
U.S. power and influence, they are unlikely to challenge at a level of 
significance that would cause counteraction by the United States.  The current 
system of international institutions as a means of defusing tension, the 
deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and economic interdependencies 
throughout the international economy, all combine to reduce probability of 
their occurrence to almost nil.12   
 
A third threat to consider is transnational criminal networks (TCN).  TCNs 
are a non-state internal and external national security threat.  TCN criminals 
will not seek to destabilize or overthrow the United States, but instead contest 
a state’s claims in matters relating to its monopoly over force and law.13  This 
is especially dangerous because states plagued by chronic state failures are 
statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational 
attacks.14  In Mexico, TCNs have effectively assumed control over many local 
and regional activities to include provision of social services, despite 
aggressive actions by the Mexican government to destroy cartel leadership 
structures.15  In many cases, the Mexican government has limited options in 
response.  TCNs desire unmolested ability to turn a profit, generally using 
illicit goods.  Unfortunately, these groups possess abilities that terror 
networks desire: Transportation, communication networks, and access to 
illicit goods.  As a result, a crime-terror nexus can occur either through 
internal transformation to develop a VEO capability, or through convergence 
                                                        
11 Roger Handberg, "The Sanctuary Approach, the First Space Arms Race: Back to the 
Future," Unpublished Manuscript.   
12 Vayrynen, Raimo, The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2006).  
13 Jarmon, Jack A., The New Era in U.S. National Security : An Introduction to 
Emerging Threats and Challenges (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).  
14 Piazza, James A., "Incubators of terror: do failed and failing states promote 
transnational terrorism?" International Studies Quarterly 52:3 (2008): 469-488, 
available at: 
http://pakistansocietyofvictimology.org/Userfiles/Terrorism%20and%20Failed%20St
ates%20ISQ%202008.pdf.  
15 Calderón, Gabriela, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Beatriz Magaloni and Gustavo Robles, "The 
Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico," Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 59:8 (2015).  
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with existing terror groups to create a hybrid group.16  This is doubly effective 
since the regional instability created by terror activities favors crime activities 
that create funds to finance terror activity.17  Despite this, TCNs are unlikely 
to take any major direct action against the United States, including significant 
collusion with VEOs, for one primary reason.  They rely upon illicit sales 
within the United States for profit; attacks (or enabling attacks) would 
degrade their “cash cow,” likely depriving them of their highly profitable 
livelihood, and thus have an exceedingly low probability of occurrence.18  In 
conclusion, while continued TCN illicit activity is likely, the probability and 
consequence of TCN-VEO collusion leading to security threats in the United 
States appears to be fairly low. 
 
Lastly, the primary non-security threats to consider are economic insolvency 
and climate change.  Recently, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and Senator Rand Paul both called the U.S. national debt the 
greatest threat to U.S. national security.19  Simony Dalby asks why more 
attention is given to a potential terrorist nuclear attack (low probability/high 
consequence) when the likelihood and negative outcome of climate change 
(high probability/grave consequences) appears much more to the detriment 
of the United States and the world.20  Both are legitimate threats, and many 
would argue that these pose a greater threat in long-term destruction to the 
United States than any other potential misfortune.  Despite this, any military 
action to mitigate them will only be part of a major concerted effort that 
combines all elements of national power.  Specifically, for climate change, 
concerted actions are needed at the international level.  This leaves the hybrid 
threat, which sits at the midway point on the probability of occurrence and 
severity of impact spectrums. 
 
The Hybrid Threat 
The Hybrid Threat Defined 
The hybrid threat occupies the realm between state-on-state (external) war 
and intrastate (internal) wars.  Figure one below visually demonstrates its 
                                                        
16 Thomas Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines," 
Sais Review 24:1(2004): 49-61, available at: 
http://www.shirleymohr.com/JHU/Sample_Articles_JHUP/SAI_2004_24_1.pdf.  
17 Jarmon, The New Era.  
18 Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime."  
19 Rand Paul, "The Biggest Threat to Our National Security," The American Spectator 
(September, 2011) available at: http://spectator.org/articles/37020/biggest-threat-our-
national-security.  
20Williams, Paul D., Security Studies: An Introduction (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013). 
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intersection between these two types of conflict.  According to General 
Dempsey, the hybrid threat is: 
 
“An area of conflict where actors blend techniques, capabilities, and 
resources to achieve their objectives… Hybrid conflicts also may be 
comprised of state and non-state actors working together toward 
shared objectives…Hybrid conflicts serve to increase ambiguity, 
complicate decision-making, and slow the coordination of effective 
responses.”21  
 
Figure 1: Conflict Spectrum from the 2015 National Military 
Strategy22  
 
 
As a result, a hybrid threat occupies the United States’ potential state or non-
state adversaries’ “sweet spot” in opportunities for action.  Adversarial states, 
a resurgent Russia and expanding China, will remain deterred from large-
scale state-on-state conflict with the United States due to its strategic nuclear 
weapon deterrence force.  Similarly, violent extremist organizations remain 
unable to do more than limited (and often uncoordinated) terror attacks on 
                                                        
21 U.S Department of Defense, National Military Strategy 2015.  
22 Ibid.  
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the U.S. homeland and overseas interests.  However, both adversaries can 
conduct unconventional (state adversaries) or conventional (non-state 
adversaries) activities to a level that renders impotent U.S. force options and 
achieves their regional objectives.  Using non-conventional means, they can 
target the United States internally by means of cyber war, specifically via 
sabotage, espionage, and subversion.23  As an example, Russian forces utilized 
proxy and irregular forces, supported by cyber attacks on Ukraine 
government command and control, to seize Crimea and other portions of the 
Ukraine.  A lack of targeting data and previous withdrawal of significant U.S. 
forces from Europe prevented significant U.S. responses beyond international 
sanctions.  Similarly, Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) forces currently 
conduct near-conventional attacks in Syria and Iraq; the U.S. withdrawal of 
major combat forces from Iraq in 2011 and a resistance to large scale force 
commitment prevented decisive actions to defeat this threat.  Recent U.S. and 
coalition actions to bolster Iraqi forces using airstrikes and special operations 
forces have had some success in Iraq, but only after months of ISIL advances. 
 
Probability 
Hybrid conflict lies midway on the probability of occurrence spectrum.  It is 
more likely than actual state-on-state conflict, but less likely than general 
terror attacks.  Several reasons support this position.  First, instances of these 
activities, as discussed in the paragraph above, are already occurring to a 
limited degree in the international arena.  Ineffective U.S. responses, 
combined with continued atrophy of American military force structure, will 
only promote more adversaries to choose similar responses.   
 
Second, both VEOs and TCNs have, over time, developed more international 
objectives when compared to their activity only a short time ago.  Martha 
Crenshaw compares “old” terrorists who “sought short-term political power 
through revolution, national liberation, or secession” and “new” terrorist 
groups who “seek to transform the world.”24  Similarly, TCNs, greatly assisted 
by the deregulation made possible by globalization policies, expand across 
now-porous state borders in an effort to create profits.25  Both groups now 
have much greater access to military technology once limited only to states, 
                                                        
23 Thomas Rid, "Cyber War Will Not Take Place," Journal of Strategic Studies 35:1 
(February, 2012): 5-32.  
24 Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," 
Political Psychology 21:2 (June, 2000): 405-420, available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0162-895X.00195/abstract.  
25 Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime."  
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thus decreasing the U.S. technological comparative advantage vis-à-vis its 
adversaries. 
  
Third, hybrid conflict allows “war on the cheap.”  As clearly shown in figure 
two below, the United States spends dramatically higher amounts of monies 
on defense spending.  Although this comparison assumes less significance 
when compared as a percentage of state GDP, it still is shockingly evident that 
the United States is spending to maintain its position of military supremacy in 
the international community.  Hybrid conflict techniques allow much weaker 
state or non-state adversaries to use indirect approaches to gain a position of 
advantage; using low-cost techniques such as cyber espionage enable these 
adversaries to gain intellectual property that can subsequently be reverse 
engineered and produced without a high-cost research and development price 
tag.26  Similarly, China’s effort to produce anti-ship missiles theoretically pits 
a several thousand-dollar Chinese missile against a $13 billion modern U.S. 
aircraft carrier.27  Putin used relatively low-cost hybrid techniques, including 
expansive propaganda efforts, in his seizure of portions of Ukraine to shore 
up his domestic political support in Russia.  He accomplished this 
spectacularly despite his state suffering an ongoing steady decline in Russian 
GDP annual growth rate.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
26 Jon R. Lindsay, "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare," Security Studies 22:3 
(January, 2013): 365-404, available at: 
http://erikgartzke.com/assets/lindsay2013_stuxnet.pdf.  
27 Jan Van Tol, et al., "AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept," Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010, available at: 
file:///C:/Users/Autumn/Downloads/2010.05.18-AirSea-Battle.pdf.  
28 Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, "Who Lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin," 
The Washington Quarterly 38:2 (Summer, 2015): 167-187, available at: 
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Stoner-
McFaul_Summer%202015.pdf.  
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Figure 2: 2012 International Defense Spending (in billions)29  
 
 
Fourth, as mentioned previously, adversarial states are more likely to pursue 
this less-confrontational technique instead of high-intensity conventional 
conflict because the United States still maintains a formidable strategic 
nuclear deterrence force that would promote caution.  Cyber activities, for 
example, as part of this hybrid conflict, are generally non-attributable to the 
instigator of attack.  This puts the United States at a significant disadvantage 
because without effective attribution, deterrence is also impossible; no one 
knows whom to deter.30 
 
Severity 
So how severe will the cumulative damage of hybrid attacks or conflicts be?  
Similar to the probability scale, the consequences of hybrid attacks lie midway 
on the severity scale.  Reasons for this include the effect of surprise.  State or 
non-state organizations choosing to attack using hybrid conflict techniques do 
so to take advantage of the ambiguity of their actions.  State organizations 
using proxy or irregular forces can make large battlefield gains before 
international organizations can affix firm attribution and coordinate effective 
responses.  Similarly, the United States has always struggled with detection of 
                                                        
29 Peter G. Peterson Foundation, "The United States Spends More on Defense Than the 
Next Seven Countries Combined," Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 2016, available at: 
http://www.pgpf.org/sites/default/files/PGPF-Chart-Pack.pdf.  
30 Lindsay, "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare."  
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unconventional forces due to its increased reliance on technical versus human 
intelligence-based (HUMINT) reconnaissance and surveillance.31  Research 
has shown that surprise in combat results in significant success to the 
initiator, resulting in negative effects on the victim of the surprise attack.32 
Second, hybrid conflicts are likely to cause more damage since they “blend 
conventional and irregular forces.”33  Unlike individual terror attack 
techniques that generally cause limited destruction, hybrid attacks blend 
combined arms techniques that could wreak massive damage in a short 
amount of time. 
 
Third, U.S. inaction in the face of hybrid conflicts results in loss of prestige 
within the international community.  As the sole international unipolar 
power, many look to the United States for protection and decisive action in 
the face of hybrid threats such as Russia in the Ukraine and ISIL in Iraq and 
Syria.  Unfortunately, the deceptive and ambiguous nature of hybrid action 
prevents U.S. and allied decisive action due to lack of attribution and 
identification for targeting.  Since the presence of an unchecked hybrid threat 
increases security tension regionally, it may encourage former allies to move 
from a U.S. band-wagoning approach to a regional balancing strategy.34  A 
prime example of this is Saudi Arabia’s decision to lead regional Arab military 
operations against terrorists in Yemen.35  Since coordinated international 
actions are unable to defeat hybrid threats overseas, the United States is 
forced to increase defensive border-securing measures to protect its 
homeland.                    
 
                                                        
31 Gabriel Margolis, "The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem," Global 
Security Studies 4:2 (Spring, 2013): 43-60, available at: 
http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf.  
32 Dupuy, Trevor N., The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Fairfax, VA: Da Capo 
Press, 1984); Ralph Rotte and Christoph M. Schmidt, "On the Production of Victory: 
Empirical Determinants of Battlefield Success in Modern War," The Institute for the 
Study of Labor (May, 2002), available at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp491.pdf.  
33 U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy 2015.  
34 Nuno P. Monteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful," International 
Security 36:3, available at:  
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064. 
35 Frederic Wehrey, "Into the Maelstrom: the Saudi-led Misadventure in Yemen," 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March, 2015), available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59500. 
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Defeat/Prevention Mechanisms 
In order to prevent or defeat hybrid threats from ultimately overwhelming the 
United States, it must make significant shifts to its current national security 
and policy prerogatives.  Specifically, it must modify current military and 
domestic economic policies. 
 
Military Policy Changes 
First, the United States must reinvest in HUMINT capability.  The United 
States has become increasing reliant on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles 
as a method to collect intelligence.  Unfortunately, hybrid threats use 
concealment and deception to stymie effective and timely identification.  
What is needed is a collector with the context and situational understanding 
to identify changes in an environment that indicate a pending hybrid threat 
operation.  HUMINT operators provide this by being: 
 
“Experts in their respective fields, and are on the ground to watch the 
developments unfold firsthand. HUMINT…give[s] analysts a 
perspective that ‘puts their fingers on the pulse’ of the situation; 
allowing them to know what is happening on the ground.”36  
 
Although military and Foreign Service HUMINT training is costly and time 
consuming, the payoff in situationally informed intelligence and early 
warning is much more likely to prevent hybrid conflicts from expanding 
beyond control.  Even if prevention is unsuccessful, a robust HUMINT 
collection network could provide more effective information for subsequent 
military or diplomatic action.   
 
Second, it must discard self-imposed military option limitations.  The United 
States and its allies must be prepared to deploy medium to large-scale 
military contingency forces to contain and eventually defeat non-state hybrid 
threats.  Despite recent domestic and political distaste for large-scale 
deployment operations, often they remain the sole manner of countering 
adversaries when indigenous friendly forces lack the capacity or motivation to 
fight.     
 
Third, it must develop its own effective irregular force capability in order to 
counter state hybrid threats.  Historically, U.S. Special Operations Forces 
                                                        
36 Margolis, "The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem."  
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(SOF) have filled this role.  Each U.S. Special Forces Group and Naval Special 
Warfare Detachment has a regional focus that includes immersive cultural 
and language training.  Unfortunately, OPTEMPO requirements in support of 
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Northern Africa, and the Philippines has 
forced SOF teams to operate outside of their areas of expertise.  The United 
States should dramatically expand SOF end strength and realign them back to 
their areas of geographical and cultural expertise. 
 
Fourth, to counter both state and non-state hybrid threats, it must reinforce, 
introduce, and in some cases re-introduce American forces stationed 
overseas.  The end of the Cold War resulted in a withdrawal of most U.S. 
forces from Europe and South Korea.  It now relies on an expeditionary 
capability to counter regional threats.  Since hybrid threats are able to achieve 
rapid tactical gains through the ambiguity of their actions, U.S. counter-
action, especially via a time consuming and expensive expeditionary military 
deployment, is often ineffective.  Reinforcing, introducing, or re-introducing 
permanently-assigned military forces stationed overseas provides a deterrent 
effect to prevent hybrid conflict, or a rapid response capability should 
deterrence fail. 
 
Fifth, echoing the CJCS’ 2015 National Military Strategy, the United States 
must foster innovation in military and Foreign Service personnel.37  
Expanding their opportunities for rigorous academic graduate schooling 
prepares them for recognizing opportunities, and developing innovative 
solutions while operating in a complex environment.      
 
Domestic Economic Policy Changes 
The changes mentioned above are expensive and thus infeasible given the 
United States’ current economic situation.  In order to make these options 
feasible, it must make domestic economic policy changes.  First, it must 
streamline the military budget process and find additional savings.  Currently, 
budget sequestration requirements force services to raid their training and 
readiness budget in order to meet budget reduction regulations.  Instead, 
services should be allowed to close unnecessary military bases in the 
continental United States using the well-established BRAC procedures.  
Developing procedures to limit Congressional resistance to responsible off-
ramp redundant infrastructure could allow this. 
 
                                                        
37  U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy 2015. 
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Second, the budget deficit is a daunting threat.  Frankly, U.S. international 
security/foreign policy requirements, when combined with domestic agendas, 
are very expensive.  Unfortunately, expenditures far outreach revenues; the 
only way to remedy this is to decrease expenditures (unlikely) or increase 
revenues (painful).  The United States must find a way to raise the American 
revenue base through a graduated increase in taxes while searching for 
money-saving measures in the current budget. 
   
Conclusion 
One can draw two main conclusions from this research.  First, predicting the 
future is hard; however, contemporary events do provide some indicators that 
hybrid conflicts, both state and non-state led, more than any other threat pose 
serious danger to the safety and security of the United States, especially when 
the country is involved in economic belt-tightening.  Second, defending 
against this threat is difficult.  Unfortunately, there is not a cheap method to 
prevent or counter hybrid threats.  The U.S. government, military, and 
general population must be prepared to take drastic measures to finance an 
appropriately-equipped counterforce without resulting in its own state’s 
economic ruin.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General 
Dempsey was correct when he stated:  
 
“We will not realize the goals of this 2015 National Military Strategy 
without sufficient resources...To execute this strategy; the U.S. military 
requires a sufficient level of investment in capacity, capabilities, and 
readiness so that when our Nation calls, our military remains ready to 
deliver success.”38  
 
Determining this mix in capacity, capability, and readiness is hard in 
isolation.  When balanced against domestic initiatives and requirements, it 
becomes even harder.  Academics and policymakers must combine forces to 
determine the best mix. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
38 Ibid. 
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